In this paper it is shown that the intratemporal and intertemporal preferences of each decision maker in the household can be identified even if individual consumption is not observed. This identification result is used jointly with the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to estimate the intratemporal and intertemporal features of individual preferences. This paper is one of the first attempts to provide estimates of the wife's and husband's intertemporal preferences by taking into account that household behavior is the outcome of joint decisions. The empirical findings indicate that there is heterogeneity in intertemporal preferences between wife and husband. The identification and estimation results are important for at least two reasons. First, they suggest that to answer policy questions the household decision process should be characterized using one set of preferences for each decision maker. Second, the estimates of individual preferences provided in this paper can be used to evaluate policies aimed at affecting household intertemporal behavior.
Introduction
The evaluation of many public policies requires knowledge of the preferences that determine the behavior of multiperson households. Changes in tax rates on pension assets, asset-based means-tested welfare programs, and marriage penalty relief programs are only a few examples. The traditional approach for estimating preferences assumes that households behave as single agents. Under this assumption, each household can be characterized using a unique utility function independently of the household structure. Since the unique utility function depends on household total consumption, which is observed, the intratemporal and intertemporal features of household preferences can be identified and estimated using standard methods.
Numerous papers have rejected the hypothesis that households behave as single agents. For instance, the results of Schultz (1990) , Thomas (1990) , Browning et al. (1994) , Browning and Chiappori (1998) , and Mazzocco (2008) indicate that micro-level data are not consistent with this hypothesis. The main implication of this finding is that public policies cannot be evaluated using a unique household utility function, since as shown in Mazzocco (2004) important aspects of intra-household risk sharing and specialization are ignored. Estimates of the preferences of each decision maker in the household are required. The main obstacle in the identification and estimation of individual preferences is that they depend on individual consumption, which is generally not observed. The goal of this paper is to identify and estimate such preferences using the limited amount of information which is available in household surveys. This is one of the first attempts to identify and estimate the intertemporal features of individual preferences by taking into account that household-level data are the outcome of joint decisions by household members. This paper makes two main contributions. First, it is shown that the preferences of each decision maker in the household can be identified even if individual consumption is not observed, provided that household consumption, individual labor supply, and individual wages are observed.
To illustrate the idea behind this result, consider a married couple. If individual consumption were observed, individual preferences could be identified by standard methods using individual Euler equations, i.e. one set of intertemporal optimality conditions for each agent, and intraperiod optimality conditions. Individual consumption is generally not observed, but household consumption, individual labor supply, and wages provide information on this variable. In particular, if at least one agent works in each period, the marginal rate of substitution between individual consumption and leisure should equal the real wage. As a consequence, this agent's consumption can be written as a function of labor supply and wages. Since consumption of the second agent is equal to the difference between total household consumption and consumption of the first agent, the spouse's consumption can also be written as a function of observed variables. These functions can be used to substitute out individual consumption from the marginal utilities that define the individual Euler equations and intraperiod optimality conditions. It can then be shown that these reduced-form optimality conditions and variations in household consumption, individual labor supply, and wages provide sufficient information to recover the original utility functions.
As a second contribution, individual preferences are estimated using the described identification result, a specific functional form for the individual utility functions, and data from the CEX. To evaluate the performance of the identification result, individual preferences are first estimated for single females and males with no children. For this group of households, individual consumption is observed since it is equivalent to household consumption. Individual preferences can therefore be estimated using the identification method proposed in this paper as well as standard methods.
The results indicate that the identification method performs well in the sense that the parameter estimates obtained using the identification result are comparable to the estimates obtained using standard methods. The empirical findings also suggest that there is heterogeneity in intertemporal preferences between single females and single males: the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of single males is more than twice the corresponding elasticity for single females.
The identification result is then applied to a sample of couples. Similarly to single individuals, I find strong evidence of heterogeneity in intertemporal preferences between wives and husbands.
In particular, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of wives is about half the elasticity for husbands or, equivalently in this paper, wives are about twice as risk averse as husbands. A comparison of the parameter estimates for single and married agents indicates that single males are less risk averse than married males and that single females are more risk averse than married females.
These findings have one main implication. In Mazzocco (2007) , it is shown that households behave as single agents only if individual preferences belong to the Harmonic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) class with identical curvature parameter. The preference heterogeneity found in this paper indicates that this condition is not satisfied. Therefore economists and policy makers should not rely on preference estimates obtained using the standard unitary model to evaluate alternative policy recommendations. Instead, policy analysis should be performed using individual preferences and the corresponding parameter estimates. This paper is related to the literature on the collective representation of household behavior. Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) are the first papers to characterize the household as a group of agents making joint decisions. In those papers the household decision process is modeled as a Nash bargaining problem. Chiappori (1988; 1992) extends their analysis to allow for any type of efficient decision process. The theoretical model used in the present paper is an intertemporal generalization of Chiappori's collective model. Chiappori (1988; 1982) , Fong and Zhang (2001) show that different aspects of intraperiod preferences can be identified. Donni (2004) also estimates them. The present paper is, however, one of the first attempts to identify and estimate the intertemporal features of individual preferences using household data.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the individual Euler equations are derived. Section 3 outlines the identification procedure. Section 4 describes the empirical implementation.
Section 5 discusses econometric issues. Section 6 describes the data and section 7 presents the estimation results. Section 8 concludes.
Household and Individual Euler Equations
Consider a two-person household living for T periods in an uncertain environment. In each period t ∈ {0, ..., T } and state of nature ω ∈ Ω, member i receives non-labor income y i (t, ω), consumes a private composite good in quantity c i (t, ω) and supplies labor in quantity h i (t, ω). Let C (t, ω) be household total private consumption and let l i (t, ω) = T − h i (t, ω) be leisure of member i, where T is the time available to each spouse in each period. The price of private consumption will be denoted by p (t, ω) and agent i's wage by w i (t, ω). Household members can save jointly by using a risk-free asset. Denote by s (t, ω) and R (t), respectively, the amount of wealth invested in the riskfree asset and its gross return. 1 Each household member is characterized by individual preferences, which are assumed to be separable over time and across states of nature. The corresponding utility function U i is assumed to be increasing, concave, and twice continuously differentiable. Agent i's utility function can depend on agent j's private consumption and leisure but only additively, i.e.
where δ i is the altruism parameter. Let β i be the discount factor of member i.
The next two subsections describe two different approaches to identifying and estimating the intertemporal and intratemporal features of the preferences that characterize household decisions.
Household Euler Equations
The theoretical and empirical literature on intertemporal decisions has traditionally assumed that households behave as single agents independently of the number of decision makers. This is equivalent to assuming that the utility functions of the individual members can be collapsed into a unique utility function which fully describes the preferences of the entire household. Following this approach, suppose that household preferences can be represented using a unique von NeumannMorgenstern utility function U C, l 1 , l 2 and a household discount factor β. Intertemporal decisions 1 The results of the paper are still valid if risky assets are introduced in the model.
can then be determined by solving the following problem:
The first order conditions of the unitary model (1) can be used to derive the following standard household Euler equations for consumption:
Since the variables defining these intertemporal optimality conditions are observed in various 
Individual Euler Equations
This section relaxes the assumption that the individual utility functions can be collapsed into a unique utility function. Without this restriction, it must be established how individual preferences are aggregated to determine household decisions. Following Chiappori (1988; 1992) and Mazzocco (2004; 2007) , it is assumed that every decision is on the ex-ante Pareto frontier, which implies that household intertemporal behavior can be characterized as the solution of the following Pareto problem:
where µ is a combination of Pareto weights and altruism parameters, and it can be interpreted as the relative decision power at the time of household formation.
Under standard assumptions, the following Euler equations for consumption can be derived: There is mixed evidence on the importance of liquidity constraints. For instance, Zeldes (1989) and Gross and Souleles (2002) find that borrowing constraints characterize a significant fraction of the U.S. population. Runkle (1991) , Meghir and Weber (1996) , and Carneiro and Heckman (2002) find that at most a small fraction of households are liquidity constrained. The theoretical and empirical results of this paper hold for household that are not borrowing constrained in the period considered in the analysis. 4 Second, it is assumed that there is no household production or equivalently that household production is determined exogenously. Under this assumption, if individual labor supply is observed, individual leisure is also observed. The generalization of the identification and estimation results to a framework with household production is an important research topic, but it is left for future research.
Third, it is assumed that household decisions are always on the ex-ante Pareto frontier, which implies that the individual members must be able to commit to future allocations of resources at the time of household formation. To test whether the assumption of ex-ante efficiency represents a good approximation of household decisions the following standard efficiency condition will be analyzed jointly with the Euler equations:
If individual private consumption and individual labor supply were observed, individual preferences could be estimated using the individual Euler equations and the efficiency condition. Unfortunately, consumption is only measured at the household level. The next section is devoted to
showing that the parameters that characterize household intertemporal behavior can be identified using the consumption Euler equations and the intraperiod conditions even if consumption is not observed at the individual level.
Identification of Individual Preferences
Consider a household making efficient decisions and suppose that the following variables are observed: household private consumption, individual labor supply, individual wages and interest rate.
It is assumed that each agent is characterized by a utility function which is twice continuously differentiable. But the functional form of the utility function is unknown. It will be shown that under these conditions individual preferences can be identified.
Suppose that in each period t at least one agent supplies a positive amount of labor. Without loss of generality, it will be assumed that agent 1 satisfies this restriction. Under this assumption, period t first order conditions of the intertemporal collective model imply that agent 1's marginal rate of substitution between private consumption and leisure must be equal to the real wage, i.e.,
where the parameter T is included in the function g. 5 Since household private consumption is observed, agent 2's private consumption can also be written as a function of observed variables as follows:
Using the function g, individual private consumption can be substituted out of the marginal utilities that define the Euler equations for private consumption and the intraperiod optimality conditions. Denote with f 1 k and f 2 k these transformed marginal utilities with respect to good k for agent 1 and 2. Then f 1 k and f 2 k can be defined as follows:
The transformed marginal utilities can be used to rewrite the individual private consumption Euler equations as functions of variables that are observed. To that end, the assumption that agent 1 can freely choose and decides to supply a positive amount of labor must be fulfilled for two consecutive periods. Under this restriction, the individual private consumption Euler equations can be written as follows:
Since household private consumption, individual labor supply, individual wages, and the interest rate are observed, the transformed marginal utilities f 1 c and f 2 c , and the discount factors β 1 and β 2 can be identified using methods that have been developed for the identification of Euler equations.
The remaining transformed marginal utilities can be identified using the intraperiod optimality conditions. Specifically, agent 1's marginal rate of substitution between private consumption and leisure must be equal to the real wage even if individual consumption is substituted out using the function g. This implies that
The functions f 1 c and f 2 c are known, which implies that the ratio of Pareto weights µ is identified. Finally, under the additional assumption that agent 2 can choose freely and decides to supply a positive amount of labor, agent 2's transformed marginal utility of leisure can be identified by equating her marginal rate of substitution between private consumption and leisure to the real
All Proof. In the appendix.
To provide the intuition underlying proposition 1, note that by equation (5) for every realization of the exogenous variables agent 2's transformed marginal utility of consumption must satisfy the following equality:
Consider variations in the exogenous variables that generate a group of households with identical
This group of households provides information on u 2 c,c , i.e. on how agent 2's marginal utility of consumption varies with agent 2's consumption holding everything else constant. To see this observe that f 2 c is known, which implies that it is known how f 2 c varies with C ifw 1 , h 1 , and h 2 are held constant. Since (9) is satisfied for every feasible C, how u 2 c varies with C holdingw 1 , h 1 , and h 2 constant must be equivalent to how f 2 c varies with C ifw 1 , h 1 , and h 2 are held constant. Finally, how u 2 c varies with C holdingw 1 , h 1 , and h 2 constant is equal to u 2 c,c . Consider changes in the exogenous variables that generate the group of households for which C, w 1 , and h 2 are constant, but h 1 varies. This group of households provides joint information on how agent 2's marginal utility of consumption varies with agent 2's consumption and on how g w 1 , h 1 varies with h 1 holding everything else constant. To explain this note that it is known how f 2 c varies with h 1 if C,w 1 , and h 2 are held constant. By (9), how u 2 c varies with h 1 holding C,w 1 , and h 2 constant must be equivalent to how f 2 c varies with h 1 if C,w 1 , and h 2 are held constant. Finally, observe that by varying h 1 on the right hand side of (9) we obtain information on u 2 c,c g h 1 .
Consider variations in the exogenous variables that generate the group of households for which C, h 1 , and h 2 are constant, butw 1 varies. Using the argument employed for the previous group of households, it can be argued that this set of observations provides information on u 2 c,c gw 1 . It is therefore possible to identify how g w 1 , h 1 varies with h 1 using the first group of households jointly with the second. Using the first and third group of households, it can be identified how g w 1 , h 1 varies withw 1 . Finally, since it is known how g w 1 , h 1 varies with h 1 and with w 1 , the function g is also known up to an additive constant. It is then straightforward to recover the original marginal utilities using the transformed marginal utilities and g. Proposition 1 implies that the individual preferences over private consumption and leisure that determine the intertemporal and intratemporal household decisions can be identified. This leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 1 The individual preferences over private consumption and leisure are identified up to an additive constant.
This section shows that individual preferences can be identified without assuming a particular utility function. In the following sections, specific utility functions will be used jointly with the identification result presented in this section to estimate the key parameters of the intertemporal collective model.
Empirical Implementation
The next two subsections will outline the preference and heterogeneity assumptions used in the estimation of individual preferences and the class of measurement errors that are allowed.
Preference Assumptions
The empirical analysis will focus on the estimation of individual preferences for private consumption and leisure. The implicit assumption is that private consumption and leisure are strongly separable from public consumption. Since this assumption is more realistic for the group of households with no children, the estimation will be performed using this restricted sample.
It is assumed that agent i's preferences can be represented using the following utility function:
with ρ i > 0, 0 < σ i < 1. This utility function has been used extensively in the past for its simplicity in research projects that attempt to model the relationship between consumption and leisure. The consumption function g w 1 , h 1 corresponding to these preferences can be written in the following form:
Household Heterogeneity and Measurement Errors
So far the only source of household heterogeneity is the realization of the state of nature. In the estimation of individual preferences, I will allow for two additional sources of heterogeneity. A subscript h will be used to denote an observation for household h.
The main idea underlying the identification of individual preferences is that individual consumption can be written as a function of individual labor supply and own wage. In particular, given the functional form assumed for the utility functions, individual consumption and the individual value of leisure,w 1 t T − h 1 t , should be linearly related and therefore perfectly correlated. This implication of the model can be tested using the sample of singles, since their individual consumption is observed. In the CEX, the correlation is 0.30 for single females and 0.26 for single males. This indicates that there is a positive relationship between individual consumption and value of leisure as predicted by the model. But it also suggests that there is additional heterogeneity characterizing the function g. A potential interpretation of this finding is that, for a given T − h i , the perceived value of leisure varies with age, education and seasonal dummies, because the available alternatives vary with these variables. This source of heterogeneity will be captured by assuming that agent i's utility function depends on effective leisure,l i , where effective leisure is defined aŝ
and z t,h is a vector containing the wife's and husband's age, an education dummy for the wife and for the husband, and a seasonal dummy. This implies that 6
As an additional source of heterogeneity, it will be assumed that the logarithm of the ratio of the Pareto weights varies across households according to an unknown distribution with mean lµ.
This implies that log (µ h ) can be written in the form
where η is a mean-zero random variable. It is important to remark that under ex-ante efficiency the household ratio of Pareto weights cannot change over time.
Finally, to determine which class of measurement errors can be allowed in the model, I will add measurement errors in private household consumption and individual wages. It will be assumed that the measurement errors satisfy the following three conditions. First, they are additive in the logarithm of private household consumption and individual wages. Second, let C * t,h and w i * t,h be true private household consumption and wages for household h in period t and denote with C t,h and w i t,h the observed variables. It is assumed that the true variables can be written in the following form:
where δ C and δ i w are two constants and t,h is a mean-zero random variable which is common to private consumption and wages. 7 Third, in each period t, the common component t,h are independent of the information known to the household. 8
The assumptions on preferences and household heterogeneity imply that the transformed marginal utilities for consumption have the following form:
, the individual Euler equations (6) can be written in the following form:
The individual Euler equations (7) can be written in the following form:
. 7 Under the standard assumption that measurement errors have zero mean, the constants δC and δ w i must be equal to zero and the consumption and wage measurement errors must be identical.
8 Preferences will also be estimated for single agents. In married households two respondents provide information on consumption and wages, whereas in single households only one respondent is present at the interview. To take this into account, in the estimation of preferences for singles I will also allow for measurement errors ε Finally, if one takes the logarithm of the efficiency equation (8) , this condition can be written as follows:
Taking the unconditional expectation of both sides, agent 1's Euler equations become
agent 2's Euler equations can be written as
and the efficiency condition becomes
Using the CEX data, the coefficients ρ 1 , γ i , θ i ,φ, α i , β i , and lµ+(log σ 2 − log σ 1 )−(γ 1 − 1) logφ+ (γ 2 − γ 1 ) δ C will be estimated by applying the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to these three equations. The parameters of the individual utility functions can then be recovered using the following equations:
Finally, it is important to remark that the mean of the logarithm of the ratio of the Pareto weights lµ can be identified only if it is assumed that the constant δ C is equal to zero.
Econometric Issues
The transformed Euler equations of agent 2 cannot be log-linearized. Consequently, individual preferences will be estimated using the non-linear transformed Euler equations jointly with the efficiency condition. The non-linearities in the Euler equations imply that I can only allow for the class of measurement errors introduced in the previous section, which is a special case of the measurement errors that can be allowed in linear models. To evaluate the effect of the nonlinearities on the coefficient estimates, the sample of single households will be used. In particular, the estimation of individual preferences for single households requires only the transformed Euler equation of agent 1, which can be log-linearized. The individual preferences can therefore be estimated using a linear and a non-linear version of the model. The estimates can then be compared to examine the effect of a larger class of measurement errors.
The identification result of Proposition 1 holds only if the consumption function g is well defined.
This requires that at least one household member decides to supply a positive amount of labor in two consecutive periods. In the sample of couples used in the estimation the fraction of households in which the husband supplies a positive amount of labor for the entire survey period is around 80%, whereas the fraction in which the wife works during the survey is around 70%. In spite of this, in the estimation the wive's labor supply and wage will be used to derive the consumption function g for the following two reasons. First, there is more variation in the labor supply of married women relative to married men. Second, the correlation between individual consumption and value of leisure is higher for single females relative to single males, which suggests that the correlation should be higher for married women relative to married men. All this implies that the sample used in the estimation can be composed only of households in which the wife works during the survey period. As a consequence, if the residuals of the transformed Euler equations are correlated with the labor force participation decisions of the wife, the estimation results will be affected by a selection bias.
To quantify the selection bias I will use the sample of single households. Denote with D 1 t a dummy equal to 1 if agent 1 works in period t and let ζ i t+1 be the error term corresponding to the transformed Euler equations of agent i. Since individual preferences are estimated using the sample of households in which agent 1 works at t and t + 1, the parameter estimates of both couples and singles are unbiased only if
i.e. only if ζ i t+1 is independent of the participation decisions in period t and t + 1. Suppose this independence assumption is not satisfied. For both couples and singles, the labor force participation decision of agent 1 can be formulated using the model proposed in this paper. In particular, in each period t agent 1's marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption is equal to the real wage if D 1 t = 1, but it is greater than the real wage if D 1 t = 0. Under the functional form assumptions for the individual utilities, this implies that
It is assumed that the wage equation is determined outside the model and that it can be written as log w
where X t includes labor market experience, its square, and a price index that is household and region specific. The selection equations in period t can then be written in the form log c
Suppose that ζ i t+1 , e t , and e t+1 are normally distributed with mean vector 0 and covariance matrix 
Then, by Tunali (1986) ,
,
and where φ, Φ and G are, respectively, the standard univariate normal density function, the standard univariate normal distribution function, and the standard bivariate normal distribution function. Individual consumption is observed for singles without children. Consequently, for this group of households the individual Euler equations can be estimated jointly with the labor force participation equations to quantify the selection bias. Following Newey and McFadden (1994) , the Euler equations adjusted for selection are estimated using GMM in one step by adding as moment conditions the first order conditions of the bivariate probit, which determines the probability of being in one of the four possible labor supply states defined by D 1 t and D 1 t+1 . A similar approach could be used for couples, but stronger assumptions are required. 9 The residuals of the individual Euler equations contain the expectation error implicit in these intertemporal optimality conditions. Since part of the expectation error is generated by aggregate shocks, it could be correlated across households. As suggested by Chamberlain (1984) , this implies that the Euler equations can be consistently estimated only if the sample period covered by the data is long enough to contain all the stages of the business cycle. For this reason, data from 1982 to 1998 are used in the estimation. 9 To estimate agent 1's participation equations for couples, individual consumption must be substituted out using the first order conditions for consumption, which depend on the budget constraint multiplier in the corresponding period. Using the Euler equations and an approach similar to Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) and Browning et al. (1986) , the multiplier in each period can be written as a function of the multiplier at 0 and the sequence of interest rates. If a long panel is available, the participation equations can therefore be estimated jointly with the individual Euler equations and efficiency conditions by using a fixed effect estimator. Unfortunately, the panel used in this paper covers only two consecutive period, which implies that the participation equations can be estimated only if it is assumed that the initial multiplier is constant across households or by using as a proxy for the multiplier initial wealth.
The Euler equations and the efficiency conditions will be estimated using the continuous updating GMM. The choice of this GMM estimator is based on work by Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron (1996) and Donald and Newey (2000) indicating that the continuous updating GMM estimator has smaller bias than the more common two-step efficient GMM estimator, with and without autocorrelation. Under the assumption of rational expectations, any variable known at time t should be a valid instrument for GMM. The existence of measurement errors, however, may introduce dependence between variables known at time t and concurrent and future variables, even under rational expectations. To address this problem, only variables known at t − 1 are used. This requires three consecutive observations for the same household: two to compute the growth rate for consumption, leisure, and wages, and at least one additional observation to construct the instrument set. In the CEX, labor supply and labor income data are only measured in the first and last interview, which implies that only two consecutive observations are available for each household. To address this problem, the set of instruments is constructed employing lagged cohort variables, where the cohort variables are computed using 7-years intervals for the head's year of birth. The CEX collects consumption data in each quarter of the survey. Labor supply and labor income data, however, are gathered only during the first and last interviews unless a member of the household reports changing his or her employment. In the second and third interviews the labor variables are set equal to the data reported in the first interview. Consequently, in the estimation I use quarterly variables computed using the first and last interviews.
CEX Data
Quarterly household consumption of singles is computed as the sum of food at home, food away from home, tobacco, alcohol, public and private transportation, personal care, clothing, house maintenance, heating fuel, utilities, housekeeping services, and transportation repairs, which is the definition used in Attanasio and Weber (1995) . Household consumption of couples is obtained by subtracting the expenditure on goods that are clearly public consumption from the definition used for singles, namely house maintenance, heating fuel, and housekeeping services. Quarterly individual labor supply is calculated as the number of hours usually worked per week multiplied by 13 weeks. The total amount of time that an agent can divide between labor supply and leisure, T , is set equal to 1183, which is equal to 13 hours per day times 7 days a week times 13 weeks a quarter. 10 Quarterly leisure can then be computed as T minus quarterly labor supply. The individual hourly wage rate is determined using three variables: the amount of the last gross pay, the time period the last gross pay covered, and the number of hours usually worked per week in the corresponding period. The after-tax wage rate is computed using federal effective tax rates generated by the NBER's TAXSIM model. The gross interest rate is obtained compounding the 20-year municipal bond rate for the three quarters that separate the first interview from the last.
Household consumption, individual after-tax wages, and the gross interest rate are deflated using a household specific price index. The index is calculated as a weighted average of the consumer price indices published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, with weights equal to the expenditure share for the particular consumption good.
The identification result requires that at least one household member supplies a positive amount of labor in two consecutive periods. Consequently, I drop from the sample couples in which the wife does not work during at least one of the two quarters used in the estimation. 
Results
To evaluate the performance of the identification result, individual preferences are initially estimated for single agents using several specifications. First, preferences are estimated using standard household consumption Euler equations and the intraperiod condition. Under the assumptions on 10 The 13 hours per day are computed by allocating 8 hours to sleep, 1 hour to the time required to reach the workplace, and 2 hours to exogenous household production. I also experimented with 12 and 14 hours per day. This change has a small effect on the estimation of σ, which can be explained by noting that, for any level of labor supply, T determines the amount of leisure. However, the main findings of the paper do not change. An alternative approach would be to use a time survey to compute T for married females and males, and for single females and males.
11 The fraction of couples in which the wife's wage is larger than 50 dollars is around 0.5 percent. The fraction of single males and females is around 0.2 percent. The fraction of couples in which the wife works less than 20 hours is 5 percent of the sample. The fraction of singles in which the head works less than 20 hours is around 1 percent for males and around 2 percent for females. preferences and heterogeneity of section 4, the two equations can be written as follows:
This specification corresponds to the approach traditionally used by the intertemporal literature, except that the intraperiod condition is included in the estimation to pin down the intraperiod parameter σ. 12 Second, preferences of singles are estimated using agent 1's transformed consumption
Euler equations (10) and the identification result. Note that the transformed Euler equations (10) contain the same information as equations (13) and (14), since they are obtained by substituting the intraperiod condition in the standard Euler equations.
The standard estimation and the estimation based on the identification result will be implemented using log-linearized as well as non-linear Euler equations. All specifications are estimated with and without selection correction terms.
The results for the log-linearized version of the model are reported in table 2 for females and   table 3 for males. The estimates obtained using the identification result are similar to the ones obtained using the standard method. The estimates for the coefficient ρ are about 1.7 for single males and 5 for single females. The parameter σ is precisely estimated only if the intraperiod condition is added to the estimation as an additional moment condition. In this case the wife's σ is around 0.15, whereas the husband's is around 0.50. Note that in the estimation of couples' preferences an intraperiod condition will be used in the form of the efficiency equation. This will enable me to precisely estimate σ.
The results obtained using the non-linear version of the model are reported in table 4 for single   females and table 5 for single males and are similar to the estimates obtained using the log-linearized
Euler equations. This suggests that the estimation results do not vary if measurement errors and unobserved heterogeneity are generalized to the class that can be allowed in linear models. The addition of the selection terms to the model does not produce significant differences in the results, which are reported in tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 . In all specifications the selection terms are never statistically significant. This finding can be interpreted in two different ways. Either I am not able to precisely estimate the labor force participation decision, or the unobservable heterogeneity in the participation decision is independent of the Euler equation error term. In most specifications both experience and its square have a statistically significant effect on the participation decision.
This suggests that the second interpretation is plausible and that selection biases should not have significant effects on the estimation of individual preferences for couples.
The main empirical results are the estimates for couples, which are obtained using the transformed Euler equation (10) for the wife, the transformed Euler equation (11) Finally, to test the assumption of ex-ante efficiency, the individual Euler equations (10) and (11) are also estimated without including the efficiency condition (12) . Using a distance statistic test with one degree of freedom, ex-ante efficiency cannot be rejected at any standard significance level.
To understand which features of the data generate the differences in intertemporal elasticities of substitution between females and males, consider a single agent. The parameter σ measures the consumption budget share of this individual. In the CEX, the average consumption budget share is around 0.25 for both single females and males. These numbers are consistent with the estimates obtained in this paper which are between 0.12 and 0.55.
To determine how ρ is identified, for a given σ define the composite goodC = c σ l 1−σ . Note that if a single agent decides to save one unit ofC in period t, she will be able to increase consumption at It is now straightforward to understand how the data generates a different ρ for males and females. Consider two identical single households except that the first one has a female head whereas the second one has a male head. Since males and females have identical σ, these two households face the same return onC and given this return they chooseC t+1 C t optimally. Consider an increase in the rate of return. In the data both single females and males increase the ratioC t+1 C t . However, the increase in period t + 1 consumption relative to period t is larger for males, which suggests that females have a higher willingness to pay for a smooth consumption path. heterogeneity in risk aversion reported in this paper indicates that the insurance component ex- 13 I use an IV regression instead of an OLS regression to replicate the GMM estimation and to take into consideration that labor supply is used to construct the dependent variableC as well as the regressor
plains a significant fraction of the accumulation and reduction of household wealth. However, as shown in Mazzocco (2004) , the unitary model, and therefore any simulation based on it, completely ignores this component of risk sharing. The traditional justification for using the unitary model in simulations in spite of this drawback is that there are no estimates that can be used to fix the parameters that characterize the individual intertemporal preferences. The estimates provided in this paper fill this void.
Conclusions
In this paper it is shown that the preferences of each decision maker in the household can be identified and estimated even if individual consumption is not observed. The main finding is that there is a significant difference in individual preferences, with the wife exhibiting a greater desire for smooth consumption.
The main implication of this result is that intertemporal decisions cannot be analyzed using a unique utility function for the entire household, because this approach ignores important aspects of intra-household risk sharing and specialization. This implies that any policy analysis related to household intertemporal decisions should be implemented by characterizing each household member by means of individual preferences.
The analysis can be extended in at least one directions. In this paper it is assumed that the time devoted to household production is exogenously given. Under this assumption, it can be incorporated in the available time T . An important project which is left for future research is to generalize the identification result to an environment that allows for endogenous choices of domestic labor. In the meanwhile, empirical works should model T as a function of exogenous variables that determine domestic labor. In this way, differences across households in domestic labor are captured by the heterogeneity in T .
i.e., the change varies agent 1's labor supply, but household private consumption and agent 2'sthat the identification of individual preferences requires that independent variations in C, h 1 , and h 2 are observed and that the exogenous variables can generate it. Consider the case in which only agent 1 supplies a positive amount of labor. In this case, h 2 is always equal to zero and all the reduced-form marginal utilities are known except f 2 l . In the first part of the proof, the equation defining f 2 l and variation in h 2 were never used. Consequently, the previous argument can also be applied to households in which only one agent supplies a positive amount of labor by dropping h 2 from equation (16) Asymptotic standard errors in brackets. All models are estimated with GMM using the following instruments: first to second lags of after tax real wage growth, marginal tax growth; first to fourth lags of real consumption growth, income growth, gross pay growth, labor supply growth, the household specific price index growth. All instruments are calculated at the cohort level. Asymptotic standard errors in brackets. All models are estimated with GMM using the following instruments: first to second lags of after tax real wage growth, marginal tax growth; first to fourth lags of real consumption growth, income growth, gross pay growth, labor supply growth, the household specific price index growth. All instruments are calculated at the cohort level.
B.2 Non-linear Euler Equations for Singles. Asymptotic standard errors in brackets. All models are estimated with GMM using the following instruments: first lag of after tax real wage growth; first to third lags of real consumption growth, marginal tax growth, real gross interest rate growth; first to fourth lags of income growth, the household specific price index growth; all instruments are calculated at the cohort level. Asymptotic standard errors in brackets. All models are estimated with GMM using the following instruments: first and second lags of labor supply growth; first to third lags of leisure growth; first to fourth lags of income growth, log of real gross rate of return; third and fourth lags of real consumption growth; all instruments are calculated at the cohort level.
B.3 Log-linearized Euler Equations for Singles, Controlling for Selection. Asymptotic standard errors in brackets. The estimate of µ is obtained by computing a first order Taylor expansion under the assumption that the constants in the measurements errors are equal to zero. All models are estimated with GMM using the following instruments: first to second lags of marginal tax growth; first to third lags of wife's and husband's gross pay growth; first to fourth lags of real household consumption growth, household income growth, wife's and husband's after tax real wage growth, wife's and husband's labor supply growth. 
